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Abstract
We consider the problem of determining appropriate solvency capital requirements
for an insurance company or a ﬁnancial institution. We demonstrate that the sub-
additivity condition that is often imposed on solvency capital principles can lead to
the undesirable situation where the shortfall risk increases by a merger. We propose
to complement the subadditivity condition by a regulator’s condition. We ﬁnd that
for an explicitly speciﬁed conﬁdence level, the Value-at-Risk satisﬁes the regulator’s
condition and is the “most eﬃcient” capital requirement in the sense that it min-
imizes some reasonable cost function. Within the class of concave distortion risk
measures, of which the elements, in contrast to the Value-at-Risk, exhibit the sub-
additivity property, we ﬁnd that, again for an explicitly speciﬁed conﬁdence level,
the Tail-Value-at-Risk is the optimal capital requirement satisfying the regulator’s
condition.
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11 Introduction
In a perfect capital market, due to the Modigliani & Miller (1958) irrelevance theorems,
insurance companies need not be concerned with risk management and capital allocation.
This is because investors can diversify their portfolios costlessly and can hold optimal
portfolios in accordance with their risk preferences without insurers taking any actions;
see also Doherty & Tinic (1982). In reality, besides taxes, a main capital market imperfec-
tion is asymmetric information, which makes it expensive for insurers to attract external
funds, to add to existing internal capital. Even without being in ﬁnancial distress, which
would further increase the cost of external funding, insurers can lose the opportunity of
pursuing proﬁtable new investments when internal capital has been depleted and external
capital is available only at high costs. This provides an incentive for the shareholders and
management of an insurance company to avoid holding too little capital. At the same
time, it is clear that holding too much capital is costly.
As far as the policyholders are concerned, there is considerable empirical evidence that
the demand for insurance is sensitive to the solvency position of the insurer; see Froot
(2005) and the references therein. The legislative power with respect to the protection
of policyholders against insolvency, is usually assigned to a regulatory authority, the
supervisor. Our main concern in this paper will be the point of view of the regulator.
The regulatory authority monitors the solvency position of the insurers in order to protect
the contingent claims of the policyholders.
In an insurance business the production cycle is inverted, because premiums are paid
by the policyholder before claims are paid by the insurer. An insurance portfolio may
get into distress when it turns out that claims exceed the corresponding premiums, as in
that case the obligations towards the insureds cannot be completely covered. In order to
protect the policyholders, the regulatory authority in force will impose a solvency capital
requirement. This means that the regulator requires the available capital that the company
holds, which is the surplus of assets over liabilities, to be of some minimal level, depending
on the riskiness of the business under consideration. This capital serves as a buﬀer against
the risk that premiums will turn out to be insuﬃcient to cover future policyholder claims.
Although in principle the regulator wants the solvency capital requirement as large as
possible, there clearly is a limitation on the capital cost burden that it can impose on the
insurer.
In this paper we investigate the use of risk measures for setting solvency capital re-
quirements. We demonstrate that coherent risk measures (as deﬁned by Artzner et al.
(1999)) used as solvency capital requirements can be too subadditive, in the sense that
2they may lead to an increase of the shortfall risk in case of a merger, a property that
will be undesirable from the regulator’s point of view. We propose to complement the
subadditivity condition by a regulator’s condition. We ﬁnd that for an explicitly speciﬁed
conﬁdence level, the Value-at-Risk satisﬁes the regulator’s condition and is the “most ef-
ﬁcient” capital requirement in the sense that it minimizes some reasonable cost function.
Within the class of concave distortion risk measures, of which the elements, in contrast
to the Value-at-Risk, exhibit the subadditivity property, we ﬁnd that, again for an explic-
itly speciﬁed conﬁdence level, the Tail-Value-at-Risk is the optimal capital requirement
satisfying the regulator’s condition. Although we will primarily focus on solvency capital
requirements for an insurance portfolio, the results presented hold more generally for any
(re)insurance company or ﬁnancial institution supervised by a regulatory authority.
We have chosen to use the general term “risk measure” in the title of this paper,
since the use of this term is widespread in the literature, often without specifying the
particular context and characteristics of the risk to be measured. But context matters.
We emphasize that, instead of the term “risk measure”, it might be more appropriate
here to use the more explicit term “solvency capital requirement”.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce (classes of) risk measures
and discuss some of their properties. In Section 3, we propose a method to determine
solvency capital requirements as the minimum of a cost function taking into account the
shortfall risk and the cost of capital. Section 4 discusses the subadditivity property. In
Section 5, we investigate the problem of avoiding that a merger increases the shortfall
risk. A new axiom, which we call the “regulator’s condition” and which can be used
to complement the subadditivity axiom, is introduced in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Risk measures
Consider a set Γ of real-valued random variables deﬁned on a given measurable space
(Ω,F). We will assume that X1,X2 ∈ Γ implies that X1 + X2 ∈ Γ, and also aX1 ∈ Γ for
any a > 0 and X1 +b ∈ Γ for any real b. A functional ρ : Γ → R, assigning a real number
to every element of Γ, is called a risk measure (with domain Γ).
In the sequel, we will interpret Ω as the set of states of nature at the end of some ﬁxed
reference period, for instance one year. The set Γ will be interpreted as the extended set of
losses at the end of the reference period, related to insurance portfolios that a particular
regulatory authority controls.
Let X be an element of Γ. In case all claims of the corresponding insurance portfolio
3are settled at the end of the reference period and all premiums are paid at the beginning
of the reference period, the (aggregate) loss X can be deﬁned as claims minus the sum
of premiums and investment income. In a more general setting, we can deﬁne X as the
sum of the claims to be paid out over the reference period and the provisions to be set
up at the end of the reference period, minus the sum of the provisions available at the
beginning of the reference period, the investment income and the premiums received over
the reference period. Here, claims, premiums and provisions are understood as gross
amounts, i.e., including expenses. The valuation principles on the basis of which the
value of the assets (represented by the provisions available, the premiums received and
the investment income generated) and in particular the liabilities (represented by the
provisions to be set up and the claims to be paid out), are left unspeciﬁed in this paper;
our setup is compatible with any particular valuation basis.
A portfolio faces insolvency in case its loss X is positive. In this case the obligations
towards the policyholders cannot be completely covered. Solvency reﬂects the ﬁnancial
capacity of a particular risky business to meet its contractual obligations. To protect
the policyholders from insolvency, the regulatory authority imposes a solvency capital
requirement ρ[X], which means that the available capital in the company has to be at least
equal to ρ[X]. This capital can be employed when premiums and provisions together with
the investment income, turn out to be insuﬃcient to cover the policyholders’ claims. In
principle, ρ[X] will be chosen such that one can be “fairly sure” that the event ‘X > ρ[X]’
will not occur.
Although we will stick to the interpretation of loss as introduced above, most of the
results in this paper also hold for other interpretations of the elements of Γ. In case of a
retail bank for instance, one can deﬁne X as the future diﬀerence between the value of the
liabilities (in this case mostly savings accounts) and the value of the assets (typically loans
and mortgages). The value of the bank’s assets is subject to changes in interest rates,
credit spreads and the occurrence of defaults during the reference period. The value of
the bank’s liabilities also depends on the level of interest rates, but is furthermore subject
to, for example, operational risk that the bank faces.
We ﬁx a base probability measure P on F. The base probability measure could be
the “physical probability measure”, but could also be another (for example, subjective
or risk-neutral) probability measure. Two well-known risk measures used for setting
solvency capital requirements are the Value-at-Risk and the Tail-Value-at-Risk.1 For a
given probability level p they are denoted by Qp and TVaRp, respectively. They are deﬁned
1Between these two, the Value-at-Risk is currently by far the most popular risk measure in practice,
among both regulators and risk managers; see, for example, Jorion (2001).
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Qq [X] dq, 0 < p < 1. (2)
The shortfall of the portfolio with loss X and solvency capital requirement ρ[X] is
deﬁned by
max(0,X − ρ[X]) ≡ (X − ρ[X])+ . (3)
The shortfall can be interpreted as that part of the loss that cannot be covered by the
insurer. It is also referred to as the residual risk, the insolvency risk or the policyholders’
deﬁcit.
As is well-known (see e.g., Denuit et al. (2005), p. 73), TVaRp [X] can be expressed
as a linear combination of the corresponding quantile and its expected shortfall:





(X − Qp [X])+

, (4)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the base probability measure P.
Properties of risk measures have been investigated extensively; see e.g., Goovaerts, De
Vylder & Haezendonck (1984) and Denuit et al. (2006). Some well-known properties that
risk measures may (or may not) satisfy are law invariance, monotonicity, positive homo-
geneity, translation invariance (or equivariance), subadditivity, convexity and additivity
for comonotonic risks. They are deﬁned as follows:
• Law invariance: for any X1,X2 ∈ Γ with P[X1 ≤ x] = P[X2 ≤ x] for all x ∈ R,
ρ[X1] = ρ[X2].
• Monotonicity: for any X1,X2 ∈ Γ, X1 ≤ X2 implies ρ[X1] ≤ ρ[X2].
• Positive homogeneity: for any X ∈ Γ and a > 0, ρ[aX] = aρ[X].
• Translation invariance: for any X ∈ Γ and b ∈ R, ρ[X + b] = ρ[X] + b.
• Subadditivity: for any X1,X2 ∈ Γ, ρ[X1 + X2] ≤ ρ[X1] + ρ[X2].
• Convexity: for any X1,X2 ∈ Γ and λ ∈ [0,1], ρ[λX1 + (1 − λ)X2] ≤ λ ρ[X1] +
(1 − λ) ρ[X2].
• Comonotonic additivity: for any X1,X2 ∈ Γ that are comonotonic, ρ[X1 + X2] =
ρ[X1] + ρ[X2].
5Here, and in the remainder of this paper, a stochastic inequality X1 ≤ X2 has to be
understood as X1(ω) ≤ X2(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Such inequality implies a (P-)almost sure
inequality for any probability measure on the measurable space. We recall that the random
couple (X1,X2) is said to be comonotonic if there is no pair ω1,ω2 ∈ Ω such that X1(ω1) <
X1(ω2) while X2(ω1) > X2(ω2); see Denneberg (1994). Equivalently, comonotonic random
variables can be characterized as being non-decreasing functions of a common random
variable. Comonotonicity is a very strong positive dependence notion and essentially
reduces multivariate randomness to univariate randomness. Theoretical and practical
aspects of the concept of comonotonicity in insurance and ﬁnance are considered in Dhaene
et al. (2002a,b).
In the sequel, when we consider losses Xj, we always assume that they are elements
of Γ. Also, when we mention that a risk measure satisﬁes a certain property, it has to be
interpreted as that it satisﬁes this property on Γ.
The desirability of the subadditivity property of risk measures has been a major topic
for research and discussion; see also Section 4 of this paper. As is well-known, the Value-
at-Risk does not in general satisfy the subadditivity property (although it does in various
particular cases), whereas for any p the Tail-Value-at-Risk does.
In Artzner et al. (1999), a risk measure that satisﬁes the properties of monotonicity,
positive homogeneity, translation invariance and (most noticeably) subadditivity is called
a coherent risk measure. Huber (1981), in a diﬀerent context, deﬁnes the upper expectation
ρΠ, induced by a subset Π of the set of all probability measures on the measurable space
(Ω,F), as the risk measure that attaches to any loss X the real number ρΠ [X] given by
ρΠ [X] = sup{EP [X] | P ∈ Π}. (5)
Huber (1981) proves for the case of a ﬁnite set Ω, that a risk measure satisﬁes monotonicity,
positive homogeneity, translation invariance and subadditivity (and hence is coherent as
deﬁned by Artzner et al. (1999)) if and only if it has an upper expectation representation.
This result remains valid in more general spaces (see Delbaen (2002) for details). Artzner
et al. (1999) call the elements of Π generalized scenarios.
Wang (1996) deﬁnes a family of risk measures by using the concept of distortion func-
tion as introduced by Greco (1982), Yaari (1987), Schmeidler (1989); see also Denneberg
(1990, 1994), Wang, Young & Panjer (1997) and Dhaene et al. (2004). A distortion
function is a non-decreasing function g : [0,1] → [0,1] satisfying g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
The distortion risk measure associated with distortion function g is denoted by ρg [·] and
6is deﬁned by
ρg [X] = −
Z 0
−∞
[1 − g (P [X > x])]dx +
Z ∞
0
g (P [X > x])dx, (6)
for any random variable X, provided that the integrals converge. The risk measure
ρg [X] can be interpreted as a “distorted expectation” of X, evaluated with “distorted
probabilities” in the sense of a Choquet integral; see e.g., Denneberg (1994). As is well-
known, concave distortion risk measures (induced by concave distortion functions) are a
subclass of the class of coherent risk measures.
F¨ ollmer & Schied (2002) introduce the concept of convex risk measures, which satisfy
the properties of monotonicity, translation invariance and convexity; see also Frittelli &
Rosazza Gianin (2002). The interested reader is referred to Deprez & Gerber (1985) for
early work in this direction. F¨ ollmer & Schied (2002) argue that, due to, for example,
liquidity reasons, the risk of a position increases in a nonlinear way with its size, hence
violating the axioms of subadditivity and positive homogeneity. The class of coherent risk
measures can be characterized as the class of convex risk measures that satisfy the positive
homogeneity property. As the class of convex risk measures is larger than the class of
coherent risk measures, it is sometimes called the class of weakly coherent risk measures.
In this paper we restrict our attention to investigating the desirability of the subadditivity
property for solvency capital requirements. The reader may verify that most results also
hold for the convexity of solvency capital requirements.
In general, the properties that a risk measure should satisfy depend on the risk pref-
erences in the economic environment under consideration. The sets of axioms discussed
above should be regarded as typical (and appealing) sets. From a normative point of
view, the “best set of axioms” is however nonexistent, as any normative axiomatic setting
is based on a “belief” in the axioms. Diﬀerent sets of axioms for risk measurement may
represent diﬀerent schools of thought. In this respect, the terminology “coherent” can be
somewhat misleading as it may suggest that any risk measure that is not “coherent”, but
for example, convex only, is always inadequate.
3 The required solvency capital
Consider a portfolio with future loss X. As explained above, the regulator wants the
solvency capital requirement related to X to be suﬃciently large, to ensure that the
shortfall risk is suﬃciently small. We suppose that, to reach this goal, the regulator






From (7), we see that two diﬀerent risk measures are involved in the process of setting
solvency capital requirements: the risk measure ρ that determines the solvency capital
requirement and the risk measure ϕ that measures the shortfall risk.
We will assume that ϕ satisﬁes the following condition:
ρ1 [X] ≤ ρ2 [X] ⇒ ϕ





(X − ρ2 [X])+

, (8)
which means that an increase of the solvency capital requirement implies a reduction of
the shortfall risk as measured by ϕ. A suﬃcient condition for (8) to hold is that ϕ is
monotonic.










small. However, holding a capital ρ[X] involves a capital cost ρ[X] i, where i denotes the
required excess return on capital. To avoid imposing an excessive burden on the insurer,
the regulator should take this capital cost into account. For a given risk X, a given risk
measure ϕ and a given number ε, 0 < ε < 1, we consider the cost function C (X, ρ[X])
given by




+ ρ[X] ε, (9)
which takes into account the shortfall risk and the capital cost. For convenience we
suppress in the notation the dependence of C on ϕ and ε. Here, ε can be interpreted as
a measure for the extent to which the capital cost is taken into account. The regulatory
authority can decide to let ε be company-speciﬁc or risk-speciﬁc. The optimal capital
requirement ρ[X] can now be determined as the smallest amount d that minimizes the
cost function C(X, d). In the limiting case that ε = 0, the capital cost is not taken into









Here, we use the convention that inf {φ} = ∞.
Increasing the value of ε means that the regulator increases the relative importance
of the cost of capital. This will result in a decrease of the optimal capital requirement.
In the remainder of the paper we will use the expectation to measure the shortfall
risk, hence ϕ[X] = E[X], where the expectation is taken with respect to a given base
probability measure P as introduced above. We note that the results that will be derived
using the expectation as a measure for the shortfall risk can be generalised to include the
case of distorted expectations as well. Clearly, the choice ϕ[X] = E[X] satisﬁes condition
8(8) and moreover satisﬁes all the axioms listed in Section 2. In this case, the shortfall risk
measure can be interpreted as the net stop-loss premium that has to be paid to reinsure
the insolvency risk. We state the following result:
Theorem 1 The smallest element in the set of minimizers to the cost function C (X, d)
deﬁned by




+ d ε, 0 < ε < 1, (10)
is given by
ρ[X] = Q1−ε [X]. (11)
Proof. Although an analytic proof can readily be obtained by diﬀerentiating C (X, d)
with respect to d, we prefer a geometric proof. Let us ﬁrst assume that Q1−ε [X] ≥ 0.
When d ≥ 0, the cost function C (X, d) corresponds with the surface between the distri-
bution function of X and the horizontal line y = 1, from d on, together with the surface
dε; see Figure 1. A similar interpretation for C (X, d) as a surface holds when d < 0.
One can easily verify that C (X, d) is decreasing in d if d ≤ Q1−ε [X,d] while C (X, d)
is increasing in d if d ≥ Q1−ε [X]. We can conclude that the cost function C (X, d) is
minimized by choosing d = Q1−ε [X].
Let us now assume that Q1−ε [X] < 0. A similar geometric reasoning leads to the conclu-
sion that also in this case, the cost function C (d) is minimized by Q1−ε [X].
Note that the minimum of (10) is uniquely determined, except when (1 − ε) corresponds
to a ﬂat part of the distribution function. In the latter case, the minimum is obtained
for any x for which FX(x) = 1 − ε. Determining the capital requirement as the smallest
amount for which the cost function in (10) is minimized leads to the solution (11).
From the proof of the theorem, we see that for values of d ≥ Q1−ε [X], the marginal
increase of the capital cost exceeds the marginal decrease of the expected shortfall. For
values of d ≤ Q1−ε [X], the opposite holds.
The set of minimizers of the function C(X, d) as deﬁned in (10) is equal to the set of
minimizers of the function ˜ C (X, d) deﬁned by









This follows from the fact that the cost function C(X, d) can also be written as C (X, d) =








+ ε E [X]. Minimizing the function ˜ C (·,d) has
been considered (in another context) in Ferguson (1967), Hinderer (1972) and Lemaire &
Vandermeulen (1983); see for more details Acerbi & Tasche (2002).2
2We thank Dirk Tasche and an anonymous referee for mentioning this to us.
9Remark 2 From (4) it follows that the minimal value of the cost function in (10) can be
expressed as
C (X, Q1−ε [X]) = E

(X − Q1−ε [X])+

+ Q1−ε [X]ε = εTVaR1−ε [X]. (13)
Theorem 1 provides a possible theoretical justiﬁcation for the use of Value-at-Risk to
set solvency capital requirements. Hence, to some extent the theorem supports the current
regulatory regime for banking supervision established by the Basel Capital Accord, which
has put forward a Value-at-Risk-based capital requirement approach (see Basel Committee
(1988, 1996, 2004)).
It is important to emphasize that the Value-at-Risk is not used to “measure risk”
here; it (merely) appears as an optimal capital requirement. The risk that we measure





. This approach corresponds to the classical actuarial approach
of measuring or comparing risks by determining or comparing their respective stop-loss
premiums. Therefore, the well-known problems of Value-at-Risk-based risk management
caused by not taking into account the shortfall risk and leading to an impetus to go for
gambling portfolios (see among others Basak & Shapiro (2001)), do not apply to our
context.
In Theorem 1, we determined the optimal capital requirement ρ[X] by minimizing
the cost function C (X, d) over all possible values of d. Another way of determining the
optimal capital requirement is to minimize the cost function C (X, d) over a restricted set
of possible values for d. For instance, we could restrict the set of possible capital require-
ments to the class of concave distortion risk measures that lead to a capital requirement
that is at least as large as the optimal capital requirement in the unconstrained problem.
This minimization problem is considered in the next theorem.
Theorem 3 The smallest element in the set of minimizers to the minimization problem
min
dA
C (X, d), (14)
where the cost function C(X, d) is deﬁned by (10) and the set A is deﬁned by
A = {ρg [X] | g is a concave distortion function and ρg [X] ≥ Q1−ε [X]}, (15)
is given by
ρ[X] = TV aR1−ε [X]. (16)
10Proof. It can be proven that the smallest element contained in the set A is given by
TVaR1−ε [X]; see Dhaene et al. (2006). Furthermore, from the proof of Theorem 1, it
follows that the cost function C (·,d) is non-decreasing if d ≥ Q1−ε [X]. This proves the
theorem.
The theorem states that if one wants to set the capital requirement such that it belongs
to the class of concave distortion risk measures (and hence, is subadditive), such that it
is the smallest minimizer of the problem (14) and such that it is not smaller than the
smallest minimizer of the unconstrained problem, then the optimal capital requirement is
given by the Tail-Value-at-Risk at level 1 − ε.
4 Diversiﬁcation and the subadditivity property
In this section we discuss the subadditivity condition that is often imposed on solvency
capital principles. We consider two portfolios with respective future losses X1 and X2.
We assume that the solvency capital requirement imposed by the regulator in force is
represented by the risk measure ρ. We say that the portfolios are merged when they
are jointly liable for the shortfall of the aggregate loss X1 + X2. The solvency capital
requirement imposed by the supervisory authority will in this case be equal to ρ[X1 + X2].
When each of the portfolios is not liable for the shortfall of the other portfolio, we will
say that they are stand-alone portfolios. In this case, the solvency capital requirement
for each portfolio is given by ρ[Xj]. Throughout, we assume that the losses X1 and X2
remain the same, regardless of whether or not the portfolios are merged, and that only
the (legal) liability construction changes. In practice, merging or splitting portfolios may
change management, business strategy, cost structure, and so on, and may thus change
the losses under consideration.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of splitting a merged portfolio into two stand-alone
portfolios. This will result in a change in shortfall given by
2 X
j=1
(Xj − ρ[Xj])+ − (X1 + X2 − ρ[X1 + X2])+ . (17)
As mentioned in Dhaene, Goovaerts & Kaas (2003), the following implication holds: if ρ
is superadditive, then
(X1 + X2 − ρ[X1 + X2])+ ≤
2 X
j=1
(Xj − ρ[Xj])+ . (18)
11In particular, we have that
(X1 + X2 − ρ[X1] − ρ[X2])+ ≤
2 X
j=1
(Xj − ρ[Xj])+ . (19)
From (19) we can draw the following conclusion: assume that the solvency capital re-
quirement is additive; in this case, splitting a merged portfolio into two separate entities
leads to an increase of the shortfall. Hence, from the regulator’s point of view, splitting a
merged portfolio leads to a less favorable situation when the solvency capital requirement
is additive. The same holds when the solvency capital requirement is superadditive; see
(18). Only a risk measure that is “suﬃciently subadditive” can guarantee that splitting
portfolios will not imply an increase of the shortfall.
Let us now consider the converse case of merging two stand-alone portfolios. Inequality
(19) states that the shortfall of the merged portfolio is always smaller than the sum of the
shortfalls of the stand-alone portfolios, when the solvency capital requirement is additive.
It expresses that, from the viewpoint of the regulatory authority, a merger is desirable in
the sense that the shortfall decreases, when the solvency capital requirement is additive.
The underlying reason is that within the merged portfolio, the shortfall of one of the
entities can be compensated by the gain of the other one, which is the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt of the merger. This observation can be summarized as: “a merger decreases the
shortfall”. Moreover, only taking into account the criterion of minimizing the shortfall,
inequality (19) indicates that the solvency capital of the merged portfolios can to a certain
extent be smaller than the sum of the solvency capitals of the two stand-alone portfolios.
The above observations support the belief (of many academics and practitioners) that a
solvency capital requirement should be subadditive. Indeed, when splitting a portfolio, the
solvency capital requirement should be suﬃciently subadditive to prevent an increase of
the shortfall risk. When merging two stand-alone portfolios, subadditivity may be allowed
to some extent by the regulator, as long as the shortfall risk of the merged portfolio does
not become larger than the sum of the shortfalls of the stand-alone portfolios. In axiomatic
approaches to capital allocation, the property of subadditivity is often considered as one
of the axioms.
Important to notice is that the requirement of subadditivity implies that
(X1 + X2 − ρ[X1 + X2])+ ≥ (X1 + X2 − ρ[X1] − ρ[X2])+ , (20)
and consequently, for some realizations (x1,x2) we may have that
(x1 + x2 − ρ[X1 + X2])+ > (x1 − ρ[X1])+ + (x2 − ρ[X2])+ . (21)
12Hence, when applying a subadditive risk measure in a merger, one could end up with a
larger shortfall than the sum of the shortfalls of the stand-alone entities. Therefore, the
regulatory authority needs to restrict the subadditivity in order to avoid that merging
leads to a riskier situation. In the following sections, we will further investigate the
problem of how to avoid that a risk measure for setting solvency capital requirements is
too subadditive in the sense that a merger leads to an increase of the shortfall risk.
Remark 4 We emphasize here that the comparison of the shortfall risk between the
merged and the stand-alone situation may not be the only concern of the regulator. For
instance, it is well-known that merging portfolios typically increases the probability of
systemic failure, i.e., the probability of a complete breakdown of the system, because re-
moving (legal) ﬁre walls increases the risk of ﬁnancial contagion; see e.g., Danielsson et
al. (2005). Therefore, though subadditivity may be desirable to reﬂect the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt of a merger, in view of e.g., the systemic failure probability, the desirability of the
subadditivity property for solvency capital requirements is more questionable.
It is important to note that inequality (19) does not necessarily express that merging
is advantageous for the owners of the business related to the portfolios (i.e., the sharehold-
ers). Evaluating whether a merger is advantageous for them can be done by comparing
the returns on capital for the two situations. Let Xj denote the loss (claim payments
minus premiums) over the reference period related to portfolio j and let Kj denote its
available capital, j = 1,2. If the loss Xj is smaller than the capital Kj, the capital at the
end of the reference period will be given by Kj −Xj, whereas in case the loss Xj exceeds
Kj, the business unit related to this portfolio gets ruined and the end-of-the-year capital
equals 0. Hence, for portfolio j the end-of-the-year capital is given by (Kj − Xj)+. Since
(K1 + K2 − X1 − X2)+ ≤
2 X
j=1
(Kj − Xj)+ , (22)
for maximizing the end-of-the-period capital, it is advantageous to keep the two portfolios
separated. This situation may be preferred from the shareholders’ point of view, essentially
because in this case ﬁre walls are built in, ensuring that the ruin of one portfolio will not
contaminate the other one. Notice that the optimal strategy from the owners’ point of
view is now just the opposite of the optimal strategy from the regulator’s point of view.
Inequality (22) justiﬁes the well-known advice “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”. If
the shareholders have a capital K1 + K2 at their disposal, if the riskiness of the business
is given by (X1,X2), and if their goal is to maximize the return on capital, then splitting
the risks over two stand-alone entities is always to be preferred.
13To conclude: when the regulator talks about diversiﬁcation, the decrease in shortfall
caused by merging is meant. When the shareholders talk about diversiﬁcation, the increase
in investment return caused by building in ﬁre walls is meant.
5 Avoiding that a merger increases the shortfall risk
As we observed in the previous section, any theory that postulates that risk measures
for solvency capital requirements are subadditive should constrain this subadditivity; this
to avoid that merging, which leads to a lower aggregate solvency capital requirement,
increases the shortfall risk. In this section, we will investigate a number of requirements
that could be imposed by the regulator in addition to the subadditivity requirement, in
order to ensure that the merger will indeed lead to a less risky situation.
A ﬁrst additional condition could be as follows:
For any random couple (X1,X2), the solvency capital requirement ρ has to satisfy the
condition
(X1 + X2 − ρ[X1 + X2])+ ≤
2 X
j=1
(Xj − ρ[Xj])+ . (23)
When imposing this condition, the regulator requires that the shortfall after a merger of
two portfolios with losses X1 and X2 is never larger than the sum of the shortfalls of the
stand-alone portfolios. We state the following theorem:
Theorem 5 Consider for a given solvency capital requirement ρ a random couple (X1,X2)
for which
P [X1 > ρ[X1],X2 > ρ[X2]] > 0 (24)
holds. If ρ satisﬁes condition (23) for this random couple, then one has that
ρ[X1 + X2] ≥ ρ[X1] + ρ[X2]. (25)
Proof. Consider the random couple (X1,X2) that satisﬁes condition (24). Let us
assume that ρ[X1 + X2] ≤ ρ[X1] + ρ[X2]. Then, from condition (23), we ﬁnd that
E








(Xj − ρ[Xj])+ | X1 > ρ[X1],X2 > ρ[X2]

. (26)
From this inequality and the assumption that ρ[X1 + X2] ≤ ρ[X1] + ρ[X2], one imme-
diately ﬁnds that ρ[X1 + X2] = ρ[X1] + ρ[X2] must hold. This proves the stated result.
14An immediate consequence of the theorem is that any capital requirement ρ that is
subadditive and that satisﬁes condition (23) must necessarily be additive for all random
couples (X1,X2) for which (24) holds true. Hence, any such capital requirement is “almost”
additive. Only random couples (X1,X2) that are suﬃciently negatively dependent, in the
sense that P [X1 > ρ[X1],X2 > ρ[X2]] = 0, may lead to a capital requirement for the
merged portfolio that is strictly smaller than the sum of the requirements for the stand-
alone portfolios.
The theorem illustrates the fact that the subadditivity axiom and condition (23) are
in fact not compatible. If the regulatory authority requires that a merge of portfolios will
never increase the shortfall, then it cannot propose a subadditive risk measure.
Note that from the proof of Theorem 5, we see that condition (23) in that theorem
can be weakened to condition (26).
Let us now weaken condition (23). We impose that the solvency capital requirement ρ
is such that the expected shortfall after a merger does not exceed the sum of the expected
shortfalls of the stand-alone portfolios. Hence, we will impose that ρ satisﬁes the following
additional condition for all random couples (X1,X2):
E











The subadditivity condition together with condition (27) ensures that the capital will be
decreased in case of a merger, but only to such an extent that on average the situation
does not become riskier.
In the following, we say that the (distribution functions of) given random variables
X1,...,Xn belong to the same location-scale family of distributions if there exists a ran-
dom variable Z, which we will call the generator, as well as positive real constants aj and
real constants bj such that the relation
Xj
d = aj Z + bj, (28)
holds for j = 1,...,n.
The following theorem proves that when X1, X2 and X1 + X2 belong to the same
location-scale family of distributions, condition (27) is fulﬁlled for a broad class of risk
measures.
Theorem 6 For any law invariant, translation invariant and positively homogeneous risk
measure ρ and any random couple (X1,X2) such that X1, X2 and X1 + X2 belong to the
same location-scale family of distributions and have ﬁnite variances, condition (27) is
fulﬁlled.
15Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that the mean and the variance of
the generator Z are given by E[Z] = 0 and var[Z] = 1. We further write var[Xj] = σ2
j,
j = 1,2, and var[X1 + X2] = σ2.





















σ ≤ σ1 + σ2
proves the stated result.
The theorem can be applied to the rich class of bivariate elliptical distributions, which
is the class of random couples (X1,X2) of which the characteristic function can be ex-
pressed as










, t = (t1 t2)
T, (29)
for some scalar function φ, a 2-dimensional vector µ and where Σ is of the form Σ = AAT
for some 2×m matrix A. The function φ is called the characteristic generator of (X1,X2).
Notice that the characteristic generator of the bivariate normal distribution is given by
φ(u) = exp(−u/2). A standard reference for the theory of elliptical distributions is Fang,
Kotz & Ng (1987). For applications of elliptical distributions in insurance and ﬁnance,
see Landsman & Valdez (2002).
From the theorem it follows that under elliptical assumptions a law invariant, trans-
lation invariant and positively homogeneous risk measure can never be too subadditive.
This result is independent of whether or not ρ is subadditive. In particular, it also holds
for the Value-at-Risk (which, as is well-known, is subadditive under elliptical assumptions
when the probability level p ≥ 0.5). The theorem also implies that when assuming risks
are elliptical, any law invariant, translation invariant and positively homogeneous risk
measure will always lead to an increase of the expected shortfall in case of splitting risks.
One could say that under the conditions of the theorem, “the hunger for subadditivity
can never be satisﬁed”.
Theorem 6 could give the impression that under very general conditions, requirement
(27) holds true. However, this is not the case, not even for coherent risk measures (which
exhibit a.o. translation invariance and positive homogeneity). In the following example
we illustrate that Tail-Value-at-Risk, which is undoubtedly the best-known law invariant
16coherent risk measure for setting solvency capital requirements, does not in general satisfy
condition (27).
Example 7 Suppose that X1 is uniformly distributed on the unit interval (0,1). Let X2
be the random variable deﬁned by
X2 =

0.9U if 0 < X1 ≤ 0.9,
X1 if 0.9 < X1 < 1,
where U is uniformly distributed on (0,1) and independent of X1.










For p = 0.85, we ﬁnd that the Tail-Value-at-Risk and the expected shortfall are given by
TVaR0.85[Xj] = 0.925
and
E[Xj − TVaR0.85[Xj]]+ = 0.0028125.
Consider now the sum S = X1 + X2.
For 0 < s < 2, we ﬁnd










dx1 + P [0.9 < X1 ≤ 0.5s]








1.8 + 2s − 0.9
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2
: 0 < s ≤ 0.9,
: 0.9 < s ≤ 1.8,
: 1.8 < s < 2.






















2 − 1.9d + 1.27.









Note that TV aR0.85[S] is strictly smaller than TV aR0.85[X1] + TV aR0.85[X2].
The expected shortfall of S is given by
E[(S − TVaR0.85[S])+] = 0.01.
One can verify that the expected shortfall of S is strictly larger than the sum of the expected
shortfalls of the Xj’s:
E








(Xj − TVaR0.85 [Xj])+

= 0.006.
The example above illustrates the fact that subadditive risk measures, in particular
Tail-Value-at-Risk, can be too subadditive, in the sense that the expected shortfall of a
merged portfolio can be larger than the sum of the expected shortfalls of the two stand-
alone portfolios.
Remark 8 One may ask the question whether Value-at-Risk can also be too subadditive
in the same sense. As is well-known the aggregation properties of the Value-at-Risk are
ambiguous. Clearly, a superadditive solvency capital requirement will not lead to an in-
creased shortfall risk in case of a merger. It is, however, easy to construct counterexamples
in which the Value-at-Risk is subadditive and, just like the Tail-Value-at-Risk, does not
satisfy condition (27). This conﬁrms our ﬁnding that when using a subadditive solvency
capital requirement the expected shortfall may increase in case of a merger. Because the
aggregation properties of the Value-at-Risk are in general ambiguous we have chosen to
provide a counterexample only for a solvency capital requirement that is always subadditive
(the Tail-Value-at-Risk).
6 The regulator’s condition
In the previous section we considered conditions that could be imposed in addition to the
subadditivity axiom in order to ensure that a merger does not lead to a riskier situation
in terms of shortfall risk. We found some particular results, but we did not yet ﬁnd a
general satisfying solution. In this section, we will investigate a diﬀerent approach.
18On the one hand, the regulator wants the shortfall risk to be as small as possible,
which means a preference for a large solvency capital requirement. On the other hand,
the regulator does not want to decrease the shortfall risk at any price, imposing a large
burden on the insurance industry.
Taking into account the above considerations, we propose the following requirement
that a risk measure ρ for determining the solvency capital required for a risky business
should satisfy:
For any random couple (X1,X2) and a given number 0 < ε < 1, the solvency capital
requirement ρ has to satisfy the condition
E

(X1 + X2 − ρ[X1 + X2])+













The condition (30) can be interpreted as a compromise between the requirement of “sub-
additivity” and the requirement of “not too subadditive”. We will call it the regulator’s
condition. Here, ε can be equal to the required excess return on capital, but it could also
be a number smaller than the required excess return on capital, depending on the extent
to which the regulator is willing to take this cost into account.
Theorem 6 above can be adjusted to the following formulation:
Theorem 9 For any law invariant, translation invariant, positively homogeneous and
subadditive risk measure ρ and any random couple (X1,X2) such that X1, X2 and X1+X2
belong to the same location-scale family of distributions and have ﬁnite variances, the
regulator’s condition (30) is fulﬁlled for any 0 < ε < 1.
It follows that for elliptical random couples any law invariant coherent risk measure
satisﬁes the regulator’s condition.
Let us now consider the case of general random loss variables. We state the following
theorem:
Theorem 10 The capital requirement ρ[X] = Q1−ε [X] fulﬁlls the regulator’s condition
(30). Also, any subadditive capital requirement ρ[X] ≥ Q1−ε [X] fulﬁlls the regulator’s
condition.
Proof. The regulator’s condition (30) can be expressed in terms of the cost function
C (X,d) introduced in Theorem 1:
C (X1 + X2,ρ[X1 + X2]) ≤ C (X1,ρ[X1]) + C (X2,ρ[X2]).
19The proof for Q1−ε follows immediately from (13) and the subadditivity of Tail-Value-at-
Risk.
Let us now consider a subadditive capital requirement ρ ≥ Q1−ε. From
Q1−ε (X1 + X2) ≤ ρ[X1 + X2] ≤ ρ[X1] + ρ[X2]
and the fact that C (X1 + X2,d) is increasing in d if d ≥ Q1−ε [X1 + X2], we ﬁnd
C (X1 + X2,ρ[X1 + X2]) ≤ C (X1 + X2,ρ[X1] + ρ[X2]).
Furthermore, from (19) we ﬁnd
C (X1 + X2,ρ[X1] + ρ[X2]) ≤ C (X1,ρ[X1]) + C (X2,ρ[X2]),
which proves the stated result.
Assume that the regulator wants to set the capital requirement ρ as the one that fulﬁlls





minimal for every X. Combining Theorems 1 and 10, we ﬁnd that the solution to this
problem is given by Q1−ε, i.e., the Value-at-Risk of probability level 1 − ε.
Let us now assume that the regulator wants to use a subadditive risk measure that
fulﬁlls the regulator’s condition (30). From Theorem 10, we have that any TVaRp with
p ≥ 1 − ε belongs to this class. Furthermore, TVaR1−ε is the smallest concave distortion
risk measure that is larger than Q1−ε (see also Theorem 3 of this paper) and fulﬁlls the
regulator’s condition (30). Notice that the level of the optimal Value-at-Risk or Tail-
Value-at-Risk under consideration depends explicitly on ε, i.e., on the extent to which the
capital cost is taken into account.
We recall that the results in this paper remain valid for any choice of the probability
measure on F and can also be generalised to include distorted expectations. For instance,
Theorem 10 remains valid if Q1−ε is calculated using distorted probabilities. A version
of the minimization problem (9) with ϕ being a distortion risk measure, is considered in
Dhaene, Goovaerts & Kaas (2003), Laeven & Goovaerts (2004) and Goovaerts, Van den
Borre & Laeven (2005).3
3To illustrate this, consider as an example the proportional hazard (PH) distortion function given by
g(x) = x1/α, α ≥ 1, advocated by Wang (1996) and Wang, Young & Panjer (1997). Here, the value of the
parameter α determines the degree of risk aversion: the larger the value of α, the larger the risk aversion,
with α = 1 corresponding to the non-distorted (base) case. Applying Theorem 3.1 of Laeven & Goovaerts
(2004), we ﬁnd that the solution to problem (9) when using for ϕ the distortion risk measure induced
by a PH distortion function, is indeed given by Q1−ε, when calculated with respect to a PH distorted
probability measure. Equivalently, this solution can be regarded as a Value-at-Risk of probability level
207 Conclusion
This paper considers the problem of determining appropriate solvency capital require-
ments to be set by a regulatory authority. We showed that the Value-at-Risk arises as the
“most eﬃcient” solvency capital requirement in an intuitive minimization problem with
a cost function that balances the expected shortfall and the capital cost.
Next, we discussed the condition of subadditivity that is often imposed on solvency
capital principles. As is well-known, the Value-at-Risk does not in general satisfy the
subadditivity property (although it does for various particular cases). We showed that
subadditivity “to some extent” is justiﬁed by the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt obtained when
merging portfolios. We also demonstrated how an “unconstrained” subadditivity can lead
to the undesirable situation that a merger leads to an increase of the shortfall risk, and
we introduced the regulator’s condition as a possible remedy to this problem. Replacing
the subadditivity condition by the regulator’s condition leads to the Value-at-Risk as the
optimal solvency capital requirement. Imposing the regulator’s condition to the class
of concave distortion risk measures (of which the elements, in contrast to the Value-at-
Risk, satisfy the subadditivity property), leads to the Tail-Value-at-Risk as the optimal
solvency capital requirement. In both cases, the probability level of the (Tail-) Value-at-
Risk depends explicitly on the extent to which the capital cost is taken into account.
An issue that is left undiscussed in the paper, but that is relevant in practice when
determining appropriate solvency capital requirements, is the practical tractability of
the risk measure. Recall that the Tail-Value-at-Risk of probability level p is equal to
the average of the Value-at-Risks of level q, with q ≥ p. First, we note that while the
Value-at-Risk always exists the Tail-Value-at-Risk may not converge, that is, be inﬁnite
(models with inﬁnite means). Furthermore, because the standard error of the estimator of
1 − εα, when calculated with respect to the base probability measure P.
Suppose that the regulatory authority sets ε equal to 4%. Then, the table below displays the probability
level of the Value-at-Risk when calculated with respect to the base probability measure P, for various
values of the parameter α.







21the Value-at-Risk typically increases substantially when one goes further in the tail of the
loss distribution, it is clear that adequately and robustly estimating a Tail-Value-at-Risk
is usually more involved than estimating a Value-at-Risk of the same probability level.
This problem will be particularly relevant in the case of heavy-tailed loss variables; see
Yamai & Yoshiba (2002) and Pfeifer (2004) for compelling examples. Although these
considerations should perhaps not play a role in a discussion on optimal solvency capital
requirements, they clearly are a main concern in practice.
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